Article · 2 November 2026 - Author: Sardar Mamlin

Moments of global transition are rarely first visible at the center of international politics. Instead, they often first emerge on the margins of the map: in regions where there is a lower risk of escalation and institutions are weaker. As polarity shifts, peripheral regions become the first arenas where competing powers test, signal, and assess the limits of the emerging order. We have seen historical examples of this paradigm, and the pattern is repeating itself in today’s global reorder as well. This essay argues that in order for us to understand the contemporary shifts in the international system, a closer look into peripheral regions should be emphasized.

Yet, before one begins an argument about global reorders, it is first necessary to define what the term “global reorder” means. Drawing from works by Waltz and Gilpin, this essay will characterize a global reorder as a structural transformation in the international system resulting from shifts in the distribution of power among major states, which, in turn, leads to changes in institutional arrangements, hierarchy, and great power competition.

When one begins to analyze international order reshaping, it is crucial to first pay attention to the marginal regions of the world. Global reorders never first become visible in the center of geopolitical affairs. Rather, peripheral regions provide great powers with substantial testing grounds for systemic change, as they are usually less institutionalized and are less sustained by dense alliances and international norms. Going back into history, the Cold War first began with competition in peripheral areas like Korea, Vietnam, and later Afghanistan, rather than direct confrontation at the “core” of the international system. Later instances, such as the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2013-2014 provide striking modern examples of this phenomenon. The Russian policy in these cases has been to pursue a revisionist strategy, challenging the post-Cold War unipolar order, while attempting to weaken Western hegemony. The above-mentioned regions have functioned as “testing grounds”, where Russia has pushed the limits of the international system, avoiding direct confrontation.

Among the world’s peripheral hotspots, the region of the Arctic Circle has long been viewed as “the last white dot on the map” - a region of little importance to the state of global affairs. Today, however, interest in the Arctic is surging, as the world is indicating to sharper geopolitical competition and growing dispersion of power. As such, the Arctic offers a particularly compelling lens through which we can analyze the international (re)order. Nonetheless, for decades, a narrative of “Arctic exceptionalism” has persisted - an idea, according to which, the Arctic remains independent from normal great power rivalry, characterized instead by cooperation, stability, and rules-based governance, even when tensions rise elsewhere in the world. Yet, this exceptionalism wasn’t totally inherent to the region, rather, it had reflected the broader international system, which at the time was shaped by the liberal order dominated by the United States. As rivalry reemerged, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Arctic governance has fractured in the same manner as elsewhere, revealing that the region was never detached from global power politics, but instead mirrored them.

If the Arctic circle is indeed just a “zone of peace”, detached from the changing landscape of the international system, then the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 shouldn’t have entailed any drastic consequences for cooperation in the Arctic region. Instead, we have seen a drastic shift in the policies of the 7 Arctic states, as well as the Arctic Council’s, towards Russia’s participation in Arctic affairs. The complete halt in the Arctic Council’s operations following Russia’s invasion in February of 2022 is an excellent illustration of such a fallout¹.

Interestingly, though, that the erosion of cooperation in the Arctic has predated the full-scale war in Ukraine, and, in fact, reflects not just regional geopolitical transformations, but a deeper rupture in the international system. Just by looking back to the year of 2014, official estimates show that around 83% of Russia’s nuclear capabilities have been assigned to its Northern Fleet in the Arctic Circle. At the same time, NATO doubled its military activities between 2015 and 2020. Official documents also reveal that the United States, along with Russia, have long reframed their policies in the Arctic as the global dynamics began to shift from unilateral American-led hegemony to growing systemic rivalry. The 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, for instance, frames the region as one marked by cooperation, emphasizing sustainability, conflict-free interaction, and an institutional approach in the Arctic circle. By comparison, the 2019 Strategy reveals a stark shift in the U.S.'s policy: the terminology and the narrative have deviated to underscore great power competition, militarization, as well as Russia’s and China’s strategic ambitions. However, the evolution of the High North region from a post-Cold War institutionalized zone to a theater of strategic competition was not and is not confined within the region itself. The shift in the U.S.’s Arctic policy closely mirrors American broader strategic reorientation from a world of post-Cold War American-led liberal order to a system of growing multipolarity. Visible through its 2017 National Security Strategy, which formally introduced the concept of “great power competition" as the foundational principle of American foreign policy, the parallel evolution of Arctic and Washington's broader strategies demonstrates that the region of the Arctic Circle reflects deeper shifts in the global order.

Recent developments and shifts from Beijing also signal a shift in polarity in the international system. China published its first Arctic policy in 2018, and since then its policy towards the Arctic has been revised to reflect wider changes in the global order. Generally, it is widely accepted to divide Chinese foreign policy into two stages. Beginning with its first Arctic policy paper, China emphasized institutional governance, cooperation, and environmental protection in the region - language widely implemented in post-Cold War norms. Nonetheless, Beijing’s future developments in its approach to the region reflect its broader ambitions as an emergent global power. Its self-designation as a “near Arctic state” coincides closely with Beijing’s post-2010 shift towards global presence internationally: initiatives of similar character have been pursued by the PRC, namely the Belt and Road initiative, as well as its preeminent assertiveness towards the South China Sea. Ultimately, China’s policy in the Arctic is not an isolated case within Beijing’s broader strategy. It aligns closely with its growing readiness to challenge the obsolete unipolarity, and mirrors China’s willingness to transition to multipolarity

As Robert Gilpin argues, global orders are not static, but are, rather, periodically reshaped. The international system is dynamic, and global reorders are, therefore, not some chaotic anomalies, but structural features of international politics, and today’s structural shifts in the global system are not unique in this sense.

Ultimately, historical scholarship on the topic of global (re)orders, including works by Westad and Waltz, demonstrate that systemic rivalries and shifts in the international system first become visible in peripheral regions, as risk of escalation and deterrence are significantly weaker there. The region of the High North is not an exception to this rule, and has been used throughout this essay as a case study, as it provides a strikingly coherent look into the rearrangement of power in contemporary world politics.

If systemic shifts first become visible at the margins, policymakers simply cannot afford to sideline such regions. Historical precedents, including the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, as well as the U.S.-Russia deconfliction mechanisms in Syria in 2015 demonstrate that preserving resilient dialogue channels is not only possible, but is essential amid great power competition. Contemporary geopolitical dynamics require similar mechanisms: formalized naval communication channels, as well as robust crisis-management mechanisms, if the goal is to prevent escalations and avoid destabilization. Such escalations in outer sphere regions can easily spill over, and deepen polarization among states: local militarization, increased patrols calculate into distrust, which is not contained, but, rather, gravitates to spread beyond. Institutions in such arenas, therefore, must be designed to withstand and manage great power rivalry, not assume its absence because of the so-called “exceptionalist” nature of these regions, especially at times of transition in power distribution - something we are observing currently.

Footnotes

1. Canada, Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United States later published a joint statement on the limited resumption of cooperation in the Arctic Council in projects that do not involve Russian participation.